A new and efficient signature on commitment values by Zhang, Fangguo et al.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive) Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences 
2008 
A new and efficient signature on commitment values 
Fangguo Zhang 
Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou 
Xiaofeng Chen 
Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou 
Yi Mu 
University of Wollongong, ymu@uow.edu.au 
Willy Susilo 
wsusilo@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers 
 Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zhang, Fangguo; Chen, Xiaofeng; Mu, Yi; and Susilo, Willy: A new and efficient signature on commitment 
values 2008. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/3190 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
A new and efficient signature on commitment values 
Abstract 
We present a new short signature scheme based on a vari- ant of the Boneh-Boyen's short signatures 
schemes. Our short signature scheme is secure without requiring the random oracle model. We show 
how to prove a commit- ted value embedded in our short signature. Using this primitive, we construct an 
e±cient anonymous credential system. 
Disciplines 
Physical Sciences and Mathematics 
Publication Details 
Zhang, F., Chen, X., Mu, Y. & Susilo, W. (2008). A new and efficient signature on commitment values. 
International Journal of Network Security (IJNS), 7 (1), 101-105. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/3190 
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.7, No.1, PP.100–105, July 2008 100
A New and Efficient Signature on Commitment
Values
Fangguo Zhang1,3, Xiaofeng Chen2,3, Yi Mu4, and Willy Susilo4
(Corresponding author: Fangguo Zhang)
Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Sun Yat-Sen University1
Guangzhou 510275, P. R. China (Email: isszhfg@mail.sysu.edu.cn)
Department of Computer Science, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou 510275, P. R. China2
Guangdong Key Laboratory of Information Security Technology Guangzhou 510275, P. R. China3
School of IT and Computer Science University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia4
(Received July 15, 2006; revised and accepted Nov. 8, 2006)
Abstract
We present a new short signature scheme based on a vari-
ant of the Boneh-Boyen’s short signatures schemes. Our
short signature scheme is secure without requiring the
random oracle model. We show how to prove a commit-
ted value embedded in our short signature. Using this
primitive, we construct an efficient anonymous credential
system.
Keywords: Anonymity, anonymous credentials, commit-
ment, signature
1 Introduction
Signature schemes are a central cryptographic primitive.
Besides being an important stand-alone application, they
also constitute a building block in many cryptographic
protocols. One of important applications of signatures is
anonymous credential.
The notion of anonymous credential was introduce by
Chaum [11]. A credential system allows a user to obtain
credentials, and to prove that he has a given set of cre-
dentials. An anonymous credential system enables a user
to work with his credentials without revealing any infor-
mation not explicitly requested. A user should be able to
obtain a credential without revealing his identity, and to
prove that he has a set of credentials without revealing
any information beyond that fact. To be useful for this
application, a signature scheme must have efficient pro-
tocols for obtaining a signature on a hidden (committed)
value, and for proving in zero-knowledge the knowledge
of a signature.
An anonymous credential system should meet some es-
sential properties: It should be secure against attacks
from a coalition of users. It should be able to be used
for multiple times, i.e., so-called “multi-show”. It is
also essential that one a credential has been issued to a
user, it cannot be transferred to any one else, i.e. “non-
transferability”. It is desirable that the overheads of com-
munication and computation imposed by a credential sys-
tem to users and services must not heavily affect their
performance.
The studies of anonymous credential have gone through
several stages. After its introduction by Chaum, Brands
presented a public key based construction of anonymous
credential in which a user can provide in zero knowledge
that the credentials encoded by its certificate satisfy a
given linear Boolean formula [6]. This scheme allows only
one show, namely, two transactions from the same user
can be found performed by the same user. Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya proposed an anonymous credential scheme
based on the strong RSA assumption [7]. In this scheme,
it is possible to unlinkably prove possession of a creden-
tial supporting multi-show property. There are several
other schemes that are based on different security assump-
tions. Verheul recently proposed an efficient solution for
multi-show credentials based on the security assumptions
of Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem and Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem [15]. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya
recently also proposed generalized anonymous credential
systems and showed how to construct them from known
signature and encryption schemes [1].
As claimed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8], in or-
der to construct an anonymous credential system, it is
sufficient to exhibit a commitment scheme, a signature
scheme, and efficient protocols for (1) proving equality of
two committed values; (2) getting a signature on a com-
mitted value (without revealing this value to the signer);
and (3) proving knowledge of a signature on a committed
value.
In this paper, we propose a variant of Boneh-Boyen
short signature scheme without random oracle such that
it can be used as a building block for cryptographic pro-
tocols. We provide a protocol to prove knowledge of a sig-
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nature on a committed message and to obtain a signature
on a committed message. Our scheme can be naturally
converted into an anonymous credential scheme.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.
In the next section, we define the definitions and require-
ments for signature on commitment values. The Section 3
contains some preliminaries required throughout the pa-
per. In Section 4, we present a variant of Boneh-Boyen
short signature scheme without random oracle and give
its security analysis. In Section 5 we propose a signa-
ture on a committed message. In Section 6, we present
a basic anonymous credential system based the proposed
signature scheme. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Definitions and Requirements
Our signature scheme consists of a committer, a signer,
and a verifier. The committer commits to a value and
the signer then signs the committed value. Any one can
verify the correctness of the signature. The committer
can prove to the verifier that he knows the committed
value embedded in the signature.
Definition 1. Our signature scheme is a 6-tuple
of polynomial-time algorithms (KeyGen, Commit, Sign,
Verify, Prove, PVerify), where
• KeyGen(1`) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as
input the security parameter ` and outputs a pair of
keys (SK, VK) and param0. SK is the user’s signing
key, which is kept secret, and VK the user’s verifica-
tion key, which is made public.
• Commit, a probabilistic algorithm, takes as input a
message m from the associated message space M and
a number a and outputs a commitment c.
• Sign, a probabilistic algorithm, takes as input the
signer’s secret key SK, param0, and the commitment
c and outputs a signature s ← SignSK,VK(c).
• Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input
the signed commitment c and the signer’s public key
VK and outputs true or ⊥.
• Prove is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input
s and c and outputs (PK, Proof) proving the knowl-
edge of the committed m and c without revealing the
committed values.
• PVerify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as in-
put (PK, Proof) and outputs true or ⊥.
Our anonymous multi-show credential scheme is based
the proposed signature scheme and consists of an orga-
nization, a group of users, and a service provider. The
organization acts as the signer who issues credentials to
users for some service provided by the service provider.
Definition 2. The proposed anonymous multi-show cre-
dential scheme is a 5-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms
(KeyGen,CIssue, CVerify, CProve, CPVerify).
• KeyGen(1`).
• CIssue: The user uses Commit and the signer uses
Sign. In the end of the process, the user obtains (c, s).
• CVerify. The user checks the validity of (c, s) using
Verify.
• CProve. Using Prove, the user proves to the service
provider about his knowledge on (m, a) and s on c
and outputs (PK, Proof).
• CVerify. The service provider checks the correctness
of (PK, proof) using PVerify.
We define the security notion for our basic signature
scheme only. It is easy to extend it to the anonymous
multi-show credential scheme.
Completeness property for the signature on commit-




(SK, VK, param0) ← KeyGen(1`) ∧
(c, s) ← Sign(c, SK) ∧
true ← Verify(c, s) ∧
(PK, Proof) ← Prove(c, s) ∧




We require our schemes to meet the requirement of
existentially unforgeable against the chosen message at-
tacks. We split it into to properties: Security of signa-
ture of commitment and security of proving knowledge of
committed message in a signature. Assume there exists a
TTP adversary A who launches a chosen message attack
against our signature scheme and at most asks n queries
to the signing oracle.
Pr
[
true ← Verify(c′, s′) ∧ (c′, s′)
← A(ci, VK, param0, i = 1, · · · , n)
]
= ε.
Here, ε is negligible.
For security of proving knowledge of committed mes-
sage in a signature, we also require statistical zero knowl-
edge; that is, it is negligible for an adversary A to obtain
any information on m.
Pr
[ A knowsm|true ← Verify(PK(m), Proof) ] = ε.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Bilinear Pairings
In recent years, the bilinear pairings have been widely
applied to cryptography and enable us to construct some
new cryptographic primitives. We briefly review the nec-
essary facts about bilinear pairings using the same nota-
tion as [2, 4, 5]:
Let G1,G2 be (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime
order p. Let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator
of G2. Let ψ is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1,
with ψ(g2) = g1.
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Definition 3. A map e : G1×G2 → GT (here GT is an-
other multiplicative cyclic group such that |G1| = |G2| =
|GT | = p) is called a bilinear pairing if this map satisfies
the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp,
we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1. In other words, if
g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2,
then e(g1, g2) generates GT .
3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to
compute e(u, v) for all u ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2.
We say that (G1,G2) are bilinear groups if there exists
a group GT , a computable isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1,
and a bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT as above.
In this paper, we assume that G1 6= G2. In this
case, the co-Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (co-DDH)
in (G1,G2) is easy, but we can still assume that the De-
cision Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) in G1 is hard.
The following Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption is sug-
gested by [2, 13, 16]. [2] also provides a lower bound on
the computational complexity in a generic group model.
Definition 4. (q-SDH problem) The q-Strong Diffie-
Hellman problem in (G1,G2) is defined as follows: given
a (q + 2)-tuple (g1, g2, g2γ , · · · , g2γq ) as input, outputs a
pair (g11/γ+x, x) where x ∈ Z∗p.
An algorithm A has advantage ε in solving q-SDH in
(G1,G2) if
Pr[A(g1, g2, g2γ , · · · , g2γq ) = (g11/γ+x, x)] ≥ ε,
where the probability is over the random choice of gen-
erator in g2 ∈ G2, of γ ∈ Z∗p, and of the random bits of
A.
We say that the (q, t, ε)-SDH assumption holds in
(G1,G2) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least
ε in solving the q-SDH problem in (G1,G2).
3.2 Proofs of Knowledge of Discrete Log-
arithms
We will use the notation introduced by Camenisch and
Stadler [10] for various proofs of knowledge of discrete
logarithms. For instance,
PK{(α, β, γ) : y = gαhβ ∧ z = g′αh′γ ∧ (a ≤ α ≤ b)}
is used for proving the knowledge of integers α, β and γ
such that y = gαhβ and z = g′αh′γ holds, where a ≤ α ≤
b. Here y, g, h, z, g′ and h′ are elements of some groups
G =< g >=< h > and GT =< g′ >=< h′ >.
3.3 Pedersen Commitment Scheme
Recall the Pedersen commitment scheme [14]: given a
group G of prime order p with generators g and h, a com-
mitment to x ∈ Z∗p is formed by choosing a random r ∈ Z∗p
and setting the commitment C = gxhr. This commitment
scheme is information-theoretically hiding, and is binding
under the discrete logarithm assumption.
4 A Variant of BB04 Signature
Scheme
We describe the new signature scheme as follows. Let
e : G1 × G2 → GT be the bilinear pairing where
|G1| = |G2| = |GT | = p for some prime p. We assume
that |p| ≥ 160. As for the message space, if the signa-
ture scheme is intended to be used directly for signing
messages, then |m| = 160 is good enough, because,
given a suitable collision resistant hash function, such
as SHA-1, one can first hash a message to 160 bits, and
then sign the resulting value. So the messages m to be
signed can be regarded as an element in Zp. We also
need a very efficient and suitable conversion function
from G1 to Z∗p: [·] : G1 → Z∗p. The system parameter
is (G1, G2,GT , e, p, g1, h, g2, [·]), here g1, h ∈ G1,
g2 ∈ G2 are random generators.
Key Generation. Randomly select x, y ∈R Z∗p,
and compute u = gx2 , v = g
y
2 . The public key is u, v. The
secret key is x, y.
Signing: Given the secret key x, y ∈R Z∗p, and a
message m ∈ Zp, compute the signature
σ = (gm1 )
1
x+[gm1 ]+yr ∈ G1.
Here r is randomly selected from Z∗p. The signature is
(r, σ).




r) = e(gm1 , g2).
We now give the security theorems and proofs for the
above instantiation.
Lemma 1. If there exists a (t, qS , ε)-forger F using adap-
tive chosen message attack for the proposed signature
scheme, then there exists a (t, qS , ε)-forger F for BB04
scheme.
Proof. Recall that BB04 signature scheme is described
as follows. The system parameter is same as the above
scheme.
Key Generation. Randomly select x, y ∈R Z∗p,
and compute u = gx2 , v = g
y
2 . The public key is u, v. The
secret key is x, y.
Signing: Given the secret key x, y ∈R Z∗p, and a





The signature is (r, σ).
Verification: Verify that e(σ, ugm2 v
r) = e(g1, g2).
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Suppose that there exists a (t, qS , ε)-forger F using
adaptive chosen message attack for the proposed signa-
ture scheme, i.e., after at most qS signatures queries and
t processing time, F outputs a valid signature forgery





r) = e(gm1 , g2).
Let m′ = [gm1 ], σ
′ = σm
−1
, then we have a forgery on









r) = e(g1, g2).
Theorem 1 ([2]). Suppose the (q, t′, ε′)-SDH assumption
holds in G. Then BBS04 signature scheme is (t, qS , ε)-
secure against existential forgery under an adaptive cho-
sen message attack provided that
qS < q, ε ≥ 2(ε′ + qS
p
) ≈ 2ε′, t ≤ t′ −Θ(q2T ),
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in
(G1,G2).
So, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The proposed signature scheme is secure
against existential forgery under an adaptive chosen mes-
sage attack if the (q, t′, ε′)-SDH assumption holds in
(G1,G2).
5 Obtaining a Signature on a
Committed Value
Following Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, in order to con-
struct an anonymous credential system, it is sufficient to
exhibit a signature on a committed value. We provide a
new signature on a committed value based on the variant
of BB04 signature scheme in this section.
The system parameter is (G1, G2, GT , e, p, g1, h, g2,
[·]), here g1, h ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 are random generators.
KeyGen. Randomly select x, y ∈R Z∗p, and compute
u = gx2 , v = g
y
2 . The public key is u, v. The secret key is
x, y.
Commit: Compute c = gm1 h
a.
Sign: Given the secret key x, y ∈R Z∗p, and a com-
mitment c ∈ G1, compute the signature as follows:




The signature one c = gm1 h
a is (r, σ).
Verify: Verify that e(σ, ug[c]2 v
r) = e(c, g2).
Prove: The following protocol is a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of a signed message for above signa-
ture scheme.
Common input. The system parameter is (G1,
G2, GT , e, p, g1, h, g2, [·]), and the public key (u, v).
Prover’s input. The committed message m and
a, and signature (r, σ).
Protocol. The prover does the following:
1) Compute a blinded version of his signature (r, σ):
Randomly select r1, r2 ∈R Z∗p, and compute
c′ = (ug[c]2 v
r)r1 = ur1gr1[c]2 v
rr1 , σ′ = σr2 .
Send (c′, σ′) to the verifier.
2) PVerify. The prover and verifier compute the follow-
ing values:
A = e(σ′, c′), B = e(g1, g2), C = e(h, g2)
and then carry out the following zero-knowledge
proof protocols:
ZKP{(α, β, λ1, λ2, λ3)|A
= BαCβ ∧ c′ = uλ1gλ22 vλ3 ∧ λ1 6= 0}.
Here α = mr1r2, β = ar1r2, λ1 = r1, λ2 = r1[c], λ3 =
rr1. blind the credential by using two randomly generate
numbers r1, r2. The completeness of the proposed signa-
ture scheme on a committed value is obvious. Due to the
using of two randomly generate numbers r1, r2, the proto-
col can provide the anonymity. The protocol above uses
zero-knowledge proof, so, it is a zero-knowledge proof of
a signature on a value.
6 A Multi-show Anonymous Cre-
dential Scheme
Based on the proposed signature scheme, we can now con-
struct the multi-show anonymous credential scheme. We
will follow the notations given previously in this paper.
The system parameter is same as above signature
scheme.
• KeyGen(1`): Generate public (u, v) and private sign-
ing key (x, y).
• CIssue: The user commits to (m, a) by computing
c = gm1 h
a. and the signer computes the signature on
c: (r, σ = c
1
x+[c]+ry ).
• CVerify. The user checks e(σ, ug[c]2 vr) ?= e(c, g2).
• CProve. Using Prove, the user proves to the service
provider about his knowledge on (m, a) and (r, σ) on
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c and outputs (PK,Proof). Here, the (Proof) is the
zero-knowledge proof:
ZKP{(α, β, λ1, λ2, λ3)|A
= BαCβ ∧ c′ = uλ1gλ22 vλ3 ∧ λ1 6= 0}.
• CVerify. The service provider checks the correctness
of (PK, Proof) using PVerify.
Our credential scheme is of multi-show, i.e., the user
can blind the credential by using two randomly gener-
ate numbers r1, r2. The credential itself is never sent to
the service provider in clear. Clearly, our scheme also
supports non-transferability. To show a credential to the
service provider, the user has to know his secret (m, a).
Of course, we have to assume that his secret should not
be given to others. However, it is also not hard for us
to modify the scheme such that there exists a revocation
manager who can revoke the identity of the user if needed.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a variant of Boneh-Boyen short
signature scheme without random oracle such that it can
be used as a building block for cryptographic protocols.
We provide a protocol to prove knowledge of a signature
on a committed message and to obtain a signature on
a committed message such that it can be converted into
an efficient multi-show credential scheme. The proposed
signature scheme on a committed value in this paper has
many good properties, and for the further work, we expect
to design a group signature scheme based on this signature
scheme.
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